Adaptationism maintains that natural selection is the principal factor causing evolutionary change. This statement is in need of qualification. Indeed, Peter Godfrey-Smith finds several possible usages of the term adaptationism.
1 optimality models that take frequency-dependence into account. As a generalization of optimality models, evolutionary change in strategic settings is exclusively explained by the workings of natural selection. In contrast to this view, I
shall put forward the claim that this conception rests on an impoverished view of what constitutes a game. When properly conceived, processes such as drift or mutation play a significant role in determining evolutionary outcomes in games, more specifically, in games with a non-trivial extensive form. Thus, evolutionary games provide a case for including non-selective factors into explanations of the evolution of behavioral traits. I start by briefly characterizing adaptationism and how some standard games conform well with models focusing on natural selection. After introducing extensive form games, which model sequences of moves, I will argue that games will typically have properties that make it necessary to include non-selective factors into evolutionary explanations. Finally, I
describe the roles of mutation and drift in dynamic models of evolution in more detail, and I discuss possible criticisms as well as some implications this result has for different forms of adaptationism.
Adaptationism
Adaptationism remains a controversial topic to this day. 4 As a research program it is characterized by a strong focus on explaining the evolution of traits by natural selection. If most individuals in a population possess a certain morphological or behavioral trait, then it is exceedingly likely that past selection caused the predominance of the trait. Orzack and Sober propose three ways natural selection can be incorporated in a model of the evolution of a certain trait: natural selection could have some causal influence, an important causal influence, or natural selection could be the only important cause in the evolution of that trait.
5
It is reasonable to assume that a statement like the third one should count as adaptationist; i.e., non-selective factors such as mutation, drift, epigenetic processes, or constraints can be ignored in a model that provides an adaptationist explanation. To capture this idea, Orzack and Sober introduce the notion of sufficient explanation. Natural selection is sufficient to explain a trait if a model which disregards the influence of non-selective factors-a so-called censored model-explains the evolution of the trait as well as any more complex model which includes other factors. There are a number of subtle issues involved in this. 6 But for the specific case of evolutionary games I think one can
give a fairly appropriate characterization of this idea. In particular, I will focus my arguments on the role of natural selection and ignore the question in what sense possible outcomes of selection processes may be regarded as optimal. I believe this is justified, since adaptationists appear to accept at least the strong emphasis on natural selection in evolutionary explanations regardless of their take on the optimality of evolutionary outcomes.
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This specification of an adaptationist model makes it possible to define adaptationism. A reasonable formulation is offered by Orzack and Sober; according to them, the adaptationist thesis reads as follows: "Natural selection is a sufficient explanation for most nonmolecular traits." 8 In other words, adaptationism claims that it is almost always enough to consider censored models in order to explain or predict the prevalence of a phenotypic trait. As the most basic example of such a model consider first a one-locus two-allele population genetic model where the fitness of the A allele is 1 and the fitness of the a allele is 1 − s, s > 0.
If both alleles are present in the population, then selection will carry the A allele to fixation. 9 We can switch from this model to a phenotypic model where we
are not talking about two alleles but about two phenotypic traits. It should be emphasized that adaptationism is concerned with nonmolecular, i.e., pheno-3 typic traits. Adaptationists often admit that processes like drift may play an important role in molecular evolution; however, they deny that non-selective factors are important for phenotypic evolution.
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Models where one phenotype is superior to another in all circumstances are admittedly very simple. Their range of application is quite restricted and they should thus only serve as illustrations. One way to generalize them is given by game theory, where fitnesses, or payoffs, depend essentially on the phenotypes of other organisms. Game theory features prominently in adaptationist explanations of animal behavior. In the most simple game theoretic settings the adaptationist program appears to work perfectly fine. But, as we shall see, looking at slightly more complex (but still biologically meaningful) games changes this assessment considerably.
Evolutionary games
One of the paradigmatic games in evolutionary game theory is the Hawk-Dove game. 11 In this game, an individual can act as a hawk or as a dove regarding a resource when meeting another of its kind. If both act hawkishly, then the probability of serious injury is very high for both of them. 
The most fundamental concept in game theory is the concept of a Nash equilibrium. Players are at a Nash equilibrium when each of them chooses a strategy that is optimal given the other players' choices; i.e., as long as the other players stay with their strategy choices, then no player has an incentive to switch strategies. In the Hawk-Dove game there are three Nash equilibria. At one the row player chooses H and the column player chooses D. At another these roles are reversed. And there is a third Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where both players choose H with probability 1/2 and D with probability 1/2.
The game theoretic concept of a Nash equilibrium does by itself not tell us much about what might be an evolutionary outcome in a game. John Maynard
Smith introduced the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy for such considerations. 12 A strategy in a game is evolutionarily stable if a population who adopts this strategy cannot be invaded by a sufficiently small fraction of individuals playing a different strategy. This characterization of evolutionarily stable strategies can be stated in a mathematically precise way. The interpretation of evolutionarily stable strategies poses some interesting problems. 13 However, for our purposes this rather informal characterization of evolutionary stability is enough. Evolutionarily stable strategies and Nash equilibria are precisely related. Every evolutionarily stable strategy is a Nash equilibrium. The converse of this implication does not hold, however. Thus evolutionary stability is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
The two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the Hawk-Dove game are not evo- with a D share of more than a half, H yields a higher payoff.
Games can be a little more complex than this. Another well studied game in evolutionary game theory is the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, where the strategies are denoted by R, S and P . In this game there is a cycle of best responses: R beats S, S beats P , and P beats R. There are two players, each of them choosing a strategy simultaneously. Moreover, there is only one Nash equilibrium where both players choose each strategy with probability 1/3. This Nash equilibrium is not evolutionarily stable, however. The payoff table of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game looks as follows:
The difference between a game like Hawk-Dove and Rock-Scissors-Paper is best brought out when taking into account evolutionary dynamics. This will also serve to illustrate a point that will be of some significance below. It is important to bear in mind that the concept of evolutionary stability is static, in the sense that it does not by itself answer the question if a population evolves to an evolutionarily stable strategy or state. Evolutionary stability only answers the question why a population stays at a certain state and not how it got there.
The causal role of natural selection in the evolution of a trait is therefore insuffi-6 ciently modeled by evolutionary stability alone. Considering some evolutionary dynamics explicitly is inevitable if one wants to get a thorough understanding of the role of natural selection.
The basic equations describing selection dynamics are given by the replicator dynamics.
14 Suppose we have a game like Hawk-Dove. In a population of Hawks and Doves, let x be the frequency of H and y = 1 − x the frequency of D. Then the replicator dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game above can be given by one
This follows from the general replicator dynamics. If there are types (strategies) 1, . . . , n in the population and if x i denotes the relative frequency of type i, then the replicator dynamics is given bẏ
where x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is the state of the population, u(i, x) is the fitness of type i when the state of the population is x, and u(x, x) is the average fitness of the population. The population is assumed to be (infinitely) large, so the fitness values can be identified with the expected payoffs coming from the payoff matrix of the underlying two-player game.
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In the Hawk-Dove game every population state except x = 0 or x = 1 evolves to the evolutionarily stable strategy under the replicator dynamics. The polymorphism of H and D is not only asymptotically stable-all nearby states stay close and converge to it; it is also globally stable-the set of states not converging to it is negligible. Thus, if one would like to explain a mixture of hawkish and dovish behavior in a population, then one could try to argue that natural selection explains the evolution of the mixture sufficiently well. The replicator dynamics is a general model of selection where types with above average fitness increase in frequency and types with below average fitness decrease in frequency.
Moreover, one just has to assume implicitly that there is some kind of mutation that pushes the population away from the pure states x = 0 and x = 1. The precise nature of the mutation does not matter, however. Other non-selective processes can be ignored. Thus, the Hawk-Dove game is an excellent example for an adaptationist explanation.
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The Rock-Scissors-Paper game provides more of a challenge. With the payoffs as given above, the unique Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable.
But it is stable in a weaker sense. All evolutionary trajectories are cycling around the unique Nash equilibrium. This implies that trajectories close to it remain close, although they do not converge to the Nash equilibrium. The example of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game shows that natural selection alone does not necessarily lead to an equilibrium. More complicated dynamical behavior is also possible. 17 We may find natural phenomena other than convergence to an equilibrium where natural selection alone could nevertheless explain the phenomenon sufficiently well.
Adaptationist explanations work well for games like Hawk-Dove. They might also work well for more subtle games like Rock-Scissors-Paper. They work well in the sense that the replicator dynamics is an exemplary censored model in the sense of Orzack and Sober. Selection is the only factor causing change in the vector field that is generated by the replicator equations. But the question arises if we should expect the same nice fit between evolutionary games and adaptationist explanations in general. In order to answer this question we will have to look at the general structure of games that are important for evolutionary biology. Another standard assumption imposed on many extensive-form games is that they be games of perfect recall. This means that no player forgets any information she once had. In fact, the game considered throughout most of the rest of this paper will meet an even stronger requirement. In games of perfect information a player is never uncertain about the node she currently occupies. Player II does not know whether I is a hawk or a dove. Therefore, her information set includes two nodes:
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As we have already seen in the previous section, games need not be given in extensive form. The representation used there was termed normal form by von Neumann and Morgenstern, and it is now often called the strategic form of a game. A game in strategic form consists of a set of players, a set of pure strategies for each player, and a utility function for each player which associates a real number-the player's payoff-with each strategy profile. A strategy profile is a possible combination of the player's pure strategies. Two-player strategicform games can be presented as payoff tables as in the case of Hawk-Dove and Rock-Scissors-Paper.
Analogously to the Hawk-Dove game, every game in strategic form can be represented by a game in extensive form. Von Neumann and Morgenstern have shown that the converse also holds. Every extensive-form game can be given as a game in strategic form. A pure strategy of a player simply determines the decisions of that player at each of her information sets. The set of all these strategies is the player's strategy set. Her utility function carries over from the extensive form game as well (where possible random moves can be taken into account by taking expected values). 20 The strategic-form of the Chain Store game looks therefore like this:
It is important to notice that, from a game theoretic point of view, the transformation of extensive-form games into strategic-form games is more important than the converse transformation. The most basic game theoretic solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium or the elimination of dominated strategies, are defined for the strategic form of a game. Moreover, the above considerations suggest that extensive-form games can always be given as strategic-form games without loosing any relevant information-in fact, this is what von Neumann and Morgenstern thought. This view has not gone unchallenged, though. 21 One reason for this will be given in the next section. As it turns out, considering certain properties of extensive-form games has also important consequences for adaptationism.
Payoff genericity and structural stability
We may ask ourselves what would happen if we changed the payoffs of a strategic-form game like Hawk-Dove slightly. After all, we never know the utility functions or fitness values with complete accuracy, so it is important to take arbitrarily small changes of the numbers that represent fitnesses and utilities into account. In doing this, we see that in the Hawk-Dove game the structure of Nash equilibria is invariant with respect to sufficiently small perturbations of the players' payoff entries. We still have two pure-strategy Nash equilibria where one player chooses H and the other chooses D. And we also still have a mixed Nash equilibrium that lies close to the mixed Nash equilibrium of the original game.
These facts do not just hold for the Hawk-Dove game but for strategic-form games in general. This follows from an important theorem in game theory. To be more specific, if II chooses F with probability p and A with probability 1 − p, then I is better off with playing N as long as
i.e., as long as p > 1/3. Hence there is a continuum of Nash equilibria where player I chooses N with probability 1 and II chooses F with probability p > 1/3. This result continues to hold if the payoffs in the game tree are slightly perturbed. However, a continuum of Nash equilibria always contains a Nash equilibrium which is not essential: for some sufficiently close strategic-form game there is no nearby Nash equilibrium. This can, e.g., be seen by perturbing the payoff entries of the strategic-form representation of the Chain-Store game slightly. Therefore, for many game trees the payoffs are often constrained to be elements of a subspace of the space of corresponding strategic-form payoffs.
Continua of Nash equilibria may always emerge when there are decision nodes of information sets that are unreached in a Nash equilibrium. 23 
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Considering payoff perturbations is one way to assess the robustness of the properties of a game theoretic model. 24 When we move from a static analysis of games to a dynamic analysis, another type of robustness becomes very important. In the literature on dynamical systems this type of robustness is known as structural stability. The replicator dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game is structurally stable. This follows from Peixoto's theorem. 26 The replicator dynamics of the Rock-ScissorsPaper game is not structurally stable. This follows from the fact that the unique interior rest point of the dynamics (which coincides with the unique Nash equilibrium) is a center; i.e., all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at this rest point are purely imaginary. This implies that arbitrarily small perturbations may change the zero real parts of the eigenvalues, yielding a different qualitative behavior of the evolutionary trajectories. A perturbation of the payoffs already indicates the same. Some payoff perturbations of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game turn the unique Nash equilibrium into a sink and some into a source. 27 It should be noted that the Rock-Scissors-Paper game is essential. This implies that we will always find a Nash equilibrium close to the original one after a perturbation of the payoffs. Qualitative changes of the replicator dynamics close to the Nash equilibrium will therefore change its stability properties. This should not be too surprising, after all, since the replicator dynamics of Rock-Scissors-Paper with perturbed payoffs constitutes a possible perturbation of the replicator dynamics.
The roles of drift and mutation
What is the relation between essential Nash equilibria and structural stability on the one hand, and adaptationism on the other? This will become clear once we study the robustness properties of extensive-form games like the Chain-Store game. We have seen in the previous section that continua of Nash equilibria are unavoidable in the Chain-Store game; payoff perturbations of the extensiveform game will not destroy them. When we consider the replicator dynamics of the strategic-form game, there will thus exist a continuum of rest points since every Nash equilibrium is a rest point of the replicator dynamics. The figure below represents these rest points as black dots in the upper left part of the phase portrait:
The evolutionary dynamics here does not arise from the replicator dynamics as described previously, but from the two-population replicator dynamics where we have one population for the role of player I and another population for the role of player II. In an evolutionary context one may think of inter-actions between males and females, or of inter-species interactions. Moreover, the two-population replicator dynamics can be imbedded in a one-population replicator dynamics where each individual can be in both roles of the game.
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For illustrative purposes the two-population model is much better suited. The two-population replicator dynamics is given bẏ
where x i and y j are the relative frequencies of types in the first and the second population, respectively; x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) describe the states of the two populations; and u(i, y) and u(j, x) are the payoffs to strategies i and j, while u(x, y) and u(y, x) are the population-specific average payoffs.
As in the one-population replicator dynamics, the expressions in parentheses evaluate a type's payoff when interacting with the other population relative to the average payoff in its own population. In a strategic-form game such reasoning could be countered by appealing to payoff robustness. As we have seen, continua of Nash equilibria are not essential. Moreover, almost all strategic-form games have a finite number of Nash equilibria. 29 Hence, for strategic-form games the argument given above has no teeth. It would depend on a degenerate specification of the payoff parameters.
This counter-argument does not hold for games in extensive form, however.
As we have seen, the continuum of Nash equilibria is robust regarding payoff perturbations of the extensive form. Thus, drift remains an important factor regardless of particular payoff choices.
There is another way to reach a similar conclusion which is based on structural stability. Like the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, Chain-Store-like games are not structurally stable. This follows from the existence of a continuum of rest points (which implies eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at those rest points with zero real part). Such a continuum will not persist under perturbations of the dynamics. But unlike the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, the fact of structural instability persists under payoff perturbations in the Chain-Store game.
These results are important when we study a specific perturbation of the replicator dynamics, the selection-mutation dynamics. 30 Recall that the replicator dynamics does not model mutation explicitly. Rather, one uses implicit arguments to the effect that mutation provides enough variation such that every type will be present in the initial population. The selection-mutation dynamics includes mutation terms explicitly. For the two-population version it can be given byẋ
where ε and δ are uniform mutation rates within each population, and n, m are the numbers of strategies in each population, respectively. The last term of each equation states that at each point in time the same share of each type mutates into any other type with equal probability. This is a simplification that allows one to derive analytical results in certain cases. (In the next section, I will remark on what happens when mutation rates are not assumed to be uniform.)
Notice that we do not assume ε and δ to be equal. We will assume, however, that ε and δ are of the same order of magnitude as they go to zero.
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We are now in the position to derive the selection-mutation dynamics of the Chain-Store game, whereā = 2x E y F − x E (1 − y F ):
Since x N = 1 − x E and y A = 1 − y F , the two-population selection-mutation dy-namics of the Chain-Store game is completely specified by these two differential equations. We are interested in what happens to the component of Nash equilibria under the perturbation. Will it disappear, or will there be rest points close to the component? To answer these questions, notice we look at the selectionmutation dynamics close to x E = 0. A Taylor expansion in terms of ε based on the rest point conditioṅ
Hence, up to higher order terms in ε,
Differentiating the right-hand side of this equation with respect to y F shows that it has a unique maximum for y F ∈ [0, 1] at
then there exists a rest point close to x E = 0, y F > 1/3. When we reverse the inequality sign, there exists no such rest point. Depending on the ratio ε/δ, all trajectories will either converge to the subgame perfect equilibrium, or there will be another rest point. In the latter case, index theory 32 establishes that there exists at least one further rest point. One of them is asymptotically stable and the other one is a saddle. This is illustrated in the following phase portrait:
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Thus, in this case there exists an asymptotically stable rest point which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium where player II is prepared to fight and player I does not enter. The following phase portrait depicts the situation where the subgame perfect equilibrium is globally stable (if ε/δ is sufficiently high):
To summarize, for the replicator dynamics drift plays an essential role. Drift will play an equally essential role for all evolutionary dynamics that respect the equilibrium structure of the game, i.e. for which all Nash equilibria are rest points. In the selection-mutation dynamics, mutation plays an essential part in determining the range of evolutionary outcomes. Other biologically plausible perturbations will also have to include non-selective factors. This follows from the fact that selection results from payoff differences, which are absent along non-singleton Nash sets.
It should be noted that the Chain-Store game is by no means an exception.
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Non-singleton Nash sets may appear whenever decision nodes or information sets are unreached in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, when considering games in extensive form, evolutionary game theory ceases to fit into a strictly adaptationist framework. In general, natural selection alone does not explain evolutionary outcomes in game theoretic models.
Discussion
I argued in the previous section that if we consider the replicator dynamics as the appropriate evolutionary dynamics, then drift enters as an inevitable factor for many extensive-form games such as the Chain-Store game. One could object to that conclusion with an argument that is based on the logic of subgame perfectness. 
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Another possible criticism may be based on the following reasoning. In the selection-mutation dynamics the ratio of mutation rates does indeed influence the evolutionary outcome. But may selection not also adjust the mutation rates such that a population will reach one specific evolutionary outcome? In other words, would natural selection not favor individuals which have the "right" mutation rate given the mutation rate in the other population?
To answer this question, notice first that for the Chain-Store game we have to assume that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is in some way better than the other Nash equilibria, since it is a rest point of the selection-mutation dynamics for any sufficiently small ε, δ. This is not an innocuous statement, since the concept of subgame perfectness is not vindicated from an evolutionary point of view. 41 But let us grant it for the moment. In this case, drift enters the picture again. ε and δ may change continuously, but the only relation that matters regarding which evolutionary outcomes are possible is whether the ratio ε/δ is big enough. Thus, small changes to a mutation rate will result in the same possible evolutionary outcomes. The phenotype of having a certain mutation rate thus can have only two consequences. I would like to emphasize, though, that the fitness consequences of having a certain mutation rate are far from clear in the case of the Chain-Store game.
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The ubiquity of non-singleton Nash sets similar to the one of the ChainStore game has profound consequences for adaptationism. Godfrey-Smith distinguishes between three kinds of adaptationism: empirical, explanatory and methodological adaptationism. 42 Empirical adaptationism claims that natural selection is in fact the only important causal force in determining evolutionary trajectories. This form of adaptationism is prone to well known criticisms from population genetics. This appears not to be the case for explanatory adaptationism, which holds that though other processes may be important at, e.g., the molecular level (such as genetic drift or details of mechanisms underlying mutation), natural selection is the only important factor in explaining phenotypic adaptations of organisms (i.e. their apparent design). Methodological adaptationism, finally, states that looking for evolutionary explanations in terms of natural selection is a good methodological maxim.
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Concerning empirical adaptationism, the conclusions to be drawn from my arguments are not conclusive in themselves, since arguments solely based on theoretical models cannot decide empirical issues. But the explanatory nonsufficiency of selection in extensive-form games indicates that we should not expect empirical adaptationism to be adequate in general. Interactions that involve sequences of moves of several players are presumably abundant between all kinds of organisms. In games modeling these interactions, non-singleton Nash sets where selection ceases to work are inevitable. From a theoretical viewpoint it seems thus to be likely that in order to explain certain behaviors one must also include non-selective factors in an essential way.
Explanatory adaptationism seems to be quite suspect given the arguments from extensive-form games. Consider again the Chain-Store game. Both the subgame perfect equilibrium and the equilibria in the other Nash set are evolutionarily optimal in the minimal sense that selection stops to work once one 25 of these states is reached. Hence both kinds of equilibria describe a possible behavioral adaptation in a very basic sense. Even if we grant the point that the apparent adaptations of organisms constitute the most important problem of biology (which is not an obvious point), explaining which behavioral adaptation evolves in the Chain-Store game requires something more than just appealing to selection.
Finally, the prospects of methodological adaptationism also do not appear to be enhanced by what we know from extensive-form games. As long as one is working with games which have a trivial extensive-form structure (i.e. simultaneous move games), one need not worry too much about non-selective factors.
This does not hold for games with a non-trivial extensive-form structure. In this case one should not proceed as if selection were the only important causal factor in the evolution of a trait. Once possible obstacles like the Nash component in the Chain-Store game are identified, a more careful analysis has to be undertaken, which includes formal analysis as demonstrated here for the Chain-Store game. Understanding the results from different kinds of perturbations may then allow one to make predictions (such as the ratio of mutation rates) which can in principle be tested. 44 
Conclusion
We have seen that for games in extensive form, the adaptationist program is not feasible from the point of view of evolutionary game theory. Information sets that are unreached in a Nash equilibrium play an important role in determining evolutionary outcomes. They allow non-selective processes to become significant causal factors for influencing evolutionary trajectories. This conclusion is about behavioral traits that arise from frequency-dependent interactions. Perhaps a similar argument regarding morphological traits can be put forward. An
